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Critical Thinking and Interdisciplinarity in Environmental Higher Education: the case for epistemological and values awareness

	Journal of Geography in Higher Education, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1999, pp. 349-357
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/

PETER C. JONES & J. QUENTIN MERRITT, University of Greenwich, London, UK
CLARE PALMER, University of Stirling, UK

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Epistemology
• Epistemological Awareness in Environmental Higher Education
• Values Awareness in Environmental Higher Education
• Conclusions
• Acknowledgements
• Notes
• References

ABSTRACT
A key learning outcome of most, if not all, higher education is that students should be able to think critically about the subjects they have studied. This applies as much to broad-based undergraduate programmes in environmental higher education as elsewhere. In environmental higher education, this means that students should be able to think critically both within and across the various disciplines that constitute their study programme. An implication of this is that students need to have an awareness of the epistemological and value-based commitments that are present -though frequently unacknowledged- in all 'knowledge claims'; and, in particular, that they should be sensitive to the ways in which these commitments often vary within and between different disciplines. Put another way, it is our view that awareness of epistemological and value-related questions is a prerequisite for critical thinking in environmental higher education. Moreover, in so far as critical thinking across disciplines enables students to integrate knowledges produced within different disciplines, these two kinds of awareness are also prerequisites for interdisciplinarity.

KEYWORDS
Critical thinking, environmental higher education, interdisciplinarity, values awareness.

Introduction

In a separate paper (see the paper by Jones and Merritt elsewhere in this symposium) we have examined a number of questions relating to interdisciplinarity, values awareness and critical thinking in broad-based undergraduate programmes in environmental higher education. Amongst other things, we noted that:

• many such programmes make claims to being, or seeking to be, interdisciplinary;
• there is a widespread perception that interdisciplinarity in environmental higher education (definitional ambiguities notwithstanding) is 'a good thing';
• the last Teaching Quality Assessment exercise found that very few environmental higher education programmes actually achieve interdisciplinarity to any meaningful degree in practice.

In this paper, our point of departure is the simple claim that a key learning outcome of most, if not all, higher education is that students should. be able to think critically about the subjects they have studied (Kronholm, 1996). This applies as much to broad-based undergraduate programmes in environmental higher education as elsewhere. On the face of it, this should not be too controversial and, indeed, the documentation for most HE programmes makes some kind of explicit commitment to just such a goal.

In environmental higher education, this commitment means that students should be able to think critically both within and across the various disciplines that constitute their study programme. Again, this is surely uncontroversial, but what does it really mean? We believe it implies, amongst other things, that students need to be able to think critically about the nature of knowledge, and about the ways in which knowledge is produced and validated. Specifically, they should develop an awareness of the epistemological and value-based commitments that are present -though frequently unacknowledged- in all 'knowledge claims'; and, in particular, that they should be sensitive to the ways in which these commitments often vary between different disciplines.

Put another way, it is our view that awareness of epistemological and value-related questions is a prerequisite for critical thinking in environmental higher education. Moreover, in so far as the ability to think critically across disciplines enables students to integrate knowledges produced within different disciplines, these two kinds of awareness are also prerequisites for interdisciplinarity.

In what follows, we seek to justify our advocacy of these two kinds of awareness, beginning with a brief general discussion of epistemology.

Epistemology

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with theories of knowledge, or theories of how we can know about the world. The key point that we wish to make here is that there is no single, universally accepted theory concerning the production of knowledge, including scientific knowledge. Rather, scholars have developed a wide range of more or less distinct theories. We do not have space to review the detailed arguments for and against all of these theories here. However, we do wish to present an overview of some of the main epistemological approaches, in order to illustrate their diverse and often mutually exclusive natures.

Most of the work in analytic, Anglo-American philosophy has been concerned with developing what are called realist approaches to epistemology. Whilst these can be divided and sub-divided according to their various characteristics (Dancy, 1985), a feature they all have in common is that they allow for the possibility of purely objective knowledge; that is, knowledge of external reality which is independent of the knowing subject and her/his historical and cultural context. Such knowledge must, necessarily, be valid in an absolute or universal sense. (These epistemologies are sometimes referred to as being foundational.)

The possibility of wholly objective knowledge is rejected by anti-realists, who argue that all knowledge of external reality (including scientific knowledge) is-at least in part-necessarily subjective, or socially constructed. That is, such knowledge inescapably reflects, or is specific to, the historical and cultural conditions under which it is produced-either at the psycho-biographical level of individual scientists and/or at the structural level of society more generally. Theories of knowledge based on this view are known as constructivist epistemologies. (The terms anti-foundational and relativist are also used.)

According to Papineau (1996, p. 2), the constructivist rejection of objective knowledge in science can be traced back to 'detailed case-studies in the history of science', the most famous of which is, perhaps, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). At the same time, constructivism is also closely associated with developments in Continental Philosophy and, in particular, with the relatively recent emergence of postmodern and poststructural modes of thought (Norris, 1997). A summary of some of the problems that have been raised against the possibility of objective knowledge is provided in Fig. 1.

FIGURE. 1. Some problems with scientific knowledge

In the most extreme form of constructivism, it is claimed that knowledge is entirely determined by social processes and, therefore, that such knowledge tells us nothing whatsoever about external, reality. This is sometimes referred to as strong constructivism. In a more moderate version, knowledge is seen as reflecting both social processes and external reality. This is sometimes called weak constructivism or, to use Woodgate and Redclift's (1998) less value-laden term, mediated constructivism. This kind of constructivism allows for greater and lesser degrees of subjectivity in knowledge claims, including scientific knowledge claims, but does not admit the possibility that subjectivity can be eliminated altogether.

In one form or another, constructivism is now more or less hegemonic in the fields of science studies and the sociology of science (Murphy, 1994). However, realism is still alive and well in the philosophy of science, where writers such as Bhaskar, Harré and Salmon have produced ever-more sophisticated realist accounts -sometimes referred to as critical realism [1]- in response to the constructivist challenge (See, for example, Bhaskar et al., 1998). This body of work provides an epistemology not only for the natural and physical sciences but also for the social sciences, including human geography [2]. According to Christopher Norris, critical realism begins with a rejection of the view of anti-realist philosophers of science (such as Feyerabend) and postmodernist culture critics (such as Foucault), who argue that scientific truth claims can always be reduced to contingent observations about the various beliefs that happen to prevail in this or that interpretive community' (Norris, 1997, p. 17) or that 'scientific truth just is whatever passes as such according to the dominant beliefs, metaphors or world hypotheses. of some particular time and place' (Norris, 1997, p. 18). On the contrary, Norris maintains (citing the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida [3]), science should be seen as 'a process of conceptual exegesis and critique, one that starts out from images, naturalized metaphors, intuitive sense-certainty and the like, but which then -through successive refinements and elaborations- achieves a more adequate theoretical grasp of the phenomena it seeks to describe or explain' (Norris, 1997, p. 17). Putting all of this together, we can represent a simplified taxonomy of epistemologies as shown in Fig. 2.

FIGURE. 2. Realist and constructivist epistemologies

The account of critical realism given here is most obviously based on a rejection of strong constructivism rather than mediated constructivism. Indeed, in their general features, critical realism and mediated constructivism are certainly convergent and, in some forms at least, appear to be saying more or less the same thing. Significantly, both seem to accept that all knowledge contains both objective and subjective elements, and that the degree of subjectivity can be reduced progressively. Having surveyed the epistemological ground, we can now move on to the question of epistemology in environmental higher education.

Epistemological Awareness in Environmental Higher Education

Our work leads us to believe that questions of epistemology are not systematically addressed in most environmental higher education programmes [4]. In the case of the natural and physical sciences, we believe this causes many students (who are, after all, tomorrow's professionals, managers and practising scientists!) to emerge from EHE with what Chalmers (1988, p. 1) describes (and criticises) as a 'widely held common-sense view of science': [5]

Scientific knowledge is proven knowledge. Scientific theories are derived in some rigorous way from the facts of experience acquired by observation and experiment. Science is based on what we can see and hear and touch, etc. Personal opinion or preferences and speculative imaginings have no place in science. Science is objective. Scientific knowledge is reliable knowledge because it is objectively proven knowledge.

Against this, it might be argued that students in environmental higher education are generally made aware of the uncertain and provisional nature of much environmental science. We would accept this point but maintain, nevertheless, that this constitutes a rather superficial level of critical awareness: one which frames uncertainty and provisionality more in terms of temporary gaps in our otherwise certain knowledge, rather than one in which knowledge is seen as problematic in any more fundamental sense. Thus, students are led to believe that it is only a matter of time (and research effort) before uncertain knowledge is replaced by certain knowledge of the kind described by Chalmers. Or, as Gibson puts it in the case of 'common sense' geography: 'No doubt, with the collaboration of others, with the aid of improved instruments, we can establish the "real" nature of the physical world' (cited in Cloke et al., 1991, p. 132).

The general view of science within much environmental higher education is, then, an uncritical one. It clearly presupposes a realist epistemology and, more to the point, it is a crude realism [6]; one which has none of the philosophical rigour of traditional, analytic forms of realism nor the sociological sophistication of modern, critical realism. It is, therefore, a rather simplistic epistemology when judged alongside any formally developed epistemological position. The significance of this, from an educational point of view, is that it prevents students from thinking critically about the production and justification of scientific knowledge claims, whether made by themselves or by others. Whilst this might be a legitimate outcome for professional or vocational training, it is not, in our view, appropriate in programmes of higher education. Moreover, it is particularly inappropriate in the environmental field, where it is very often the case that:

• environmental science is generally concerned with the interactions. of natural and social systems, which are both very often complex, non-linear, dynamic and unpredictable;
• environmental science is used to justify decisions which have profound social, economic and ecological consequences;
• environmental decision making takes place within a context of competing vested interests and contested social and environmental values.

These conditions, it seems to us, are precisely those that seem most likely to yield knowledge with a significant subjective component. And, indeed, this view is reflected in a flurry of recent, constructivist writings on environmental subjects which draw upon disciplines such as anthropology, cultural studies, human geography, political science and sociology (Litfin, 1994; Hajer, 1995; Hannigan, 1995; Eder, 1996; Milton, 1996; Myerson & Rydin, 1996; Paterson, 1996; Vogel, 1996; Yearley, 1996; Anderson, 1997; Chapman et al., 1997; Dryzek, 1997; Macnaghton & Urry, 1998).

In environmental higher education programmes where epistemological questions are not systematically addressed, it is hard to see how students could make any real sense of such constructivist material. Moreover, since this material is incommensurable with the crude realist view of knowledge students most often encounter elsewhere in their studies, it is hard to imagine that any attempt to integrate the two modes of thought would leave students anything other than confused. Consequently, students would seem to be left with little option but to compartmentalise their learning. In such circumstances, there can be no true interdisciplinarity.

In summary, then, we have so far argued that a lack of epistemological awareness renders students blind to the subjective component that is present to some extent in all knowledge claims; and we have suggested that this is particularly problematic in the case of environmental higher education. In the section that follows, we propose that where a lack of epistemological awareness is combined with a lack of values awareness, students will be ill-equipped to analyse the value-laden nature of knowledge in general, and environmental knowledge in particular. To counter this, we suggest that value-related questions should be examined in the same systematic manner as we have proposed for epistemological questions.

Values Awareness in Environmental Higher Education

The learning experience of students in environmental higher education may be said to bear, in one way or another, a wide range of 'values', which may relate to the environment and/or to society (e.g. cultural, economic, political, social values). These values may be an explicit focus of particular courses (e.g. on environmental philosophy or ethics), they may be embodied within the supposedly 'value-free' natural and social sciences; and, more generally, they may reside in the aggregate 'learning context' of environmental higher education. For example, students may encounter value judgements emanating directly from individual tutors, both during and outside formal teaching sessions. However much tutors might seek to set aside their personal values, it is inevitable that some of these are conveyed to students -overtly or covertly- through verbal and non-verbal communications. Explicitly value-laden messages might concern, for example, tutors' judgements on the views of environmental opinion formers or the actions of decision makers (e.g. the mass media, pressure groups, government, business). Implicit expressions of value commitment might reside in communications as diverse as tutors' evaluations of proposed research topics, their provision of 'careers' advice, and even (though by no means least important) evidence of their own lifestyles.

Students are also exposed to more or less hidden value judgements via the documentary sources they consult, including those recommended by tutors. Books, articles and reports abound with endorsements of particular value-laden choices, in individual behaviour and -especially- in environmental management and policy making. Whilst some acknowledge and defend their value-basis, many fail to do so; and it is frequently the case that value-laden conclusions are presented as deriving unproblematically and incontestably from empirical evidence, an error of reasoning referred to by philosophers as the 'naturalistic fallacy' (Graham, 1981, p. 1).

Values -hidden and revealed- are more systematically embedded within students' learning via the formal curriculum, and unavoidably so. For example, courses or components thereof may exhibit some kind of ecocentric orientation -with an emphasis on the intrinsic worth of nature conservation; or an anthropocentric orientation- perhaps focusing on pollution control, waste management and/or rural recreation management. In more and less subtle ways, environmental higher education curricula may bear the imprint of their immediate institutional context (e.g. a given profile of staff expertise, or a particular institutional mission); of government policy (e.g. the UK's former Enterprise in Higher Education scheme, and the more recent Dearing Report's advocacy of 'lifelong learning' for employability: see National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, 1997); of other HE sponsors and stakeholders (especially business, professional bodies, learned societies and research councils); and of student demand, for some kinds of course in preference to others.

This latter point should remind us that students themselves are active agents in the construction of values within environmental higher education and not simply passive consumers of values emanating from within this specialty and beyond (e.g. the mass media). First, students come to environmental higher education with their own sets of personal values, including environmental values -albeit that they may be somewhat inchoate. And second, it seems probable (and consistent with our own experience) that environmental higher education students tend to cohere as a 'cultural community' and, in so doing, tend to reinforce one another's environmental and other values. This proposition is consistent with Rosemary Stevenson's (1992) argument that, for cultural groupings in general, existing views -once established- will tend to be reinforced by the partially pre-selected experiences of group members; that is, by what they see, hear, read and so on. They tend, she claims, to adopt a less critical approach to evidence and arguments that are consistent with their existing beliefs, and a more critical one to those that contradict them.

Amongst the least recognised and deeply seated of influences -on HE teachers, students, source materials and curricula alike- is that of the knowledge or 'epistemic' communities with which environmental higher education is associated, either directly or indirectly. We are referring to those bodies of -mainly taken-for-granted- knowledge which are characteristically shared amongst members of an academic discipline or profession. (For a overview of 'disciplinary cultures' -including social, as well as intellectual, differences- see Becher & Huber, 1990.) This includes assumptions concerning the nature of 'reality', and ways in which knowledge can be produced and validated; bodies of theoretical knowledge; assumptions as to what are the most important objects for scholarly attention; and, indeed, beliefs concerning the learning processes by which students can most effectively graduate to full membership of such a community. The degree to which such assumptions are recognised seems to vary between disciplinary communities. It is not uncommon, for instance, for social science and humanities disciplines to attempt, at least, to acknowledge and critique their underlying assumptions -and to tolerate and debate difference- both in their research and their teaching. This may provide some opportunities for students to identify and explore the value commitments embedded within their education. Such critical awareness is less often displayed in natural and physical science communities where, whilst experimental results and interpretations may often be contested, the nature of scientific knowledge and its methods is less widely discussed.

Hence we argue that environmental higher education is pervasively value-laden: it is pervaded both with values which are routinely acknowledged and made explicit in the learning process; and with those which are frequently unacknowledged, mutually inconsistent, and often concealed from students and teachers alike. Contra those who believe environmental higher education can and should be value-neutral, we maintain that values must be accommodated: that they should -so far as possible- be made explicit, and that students should learn to recognise and think critically about them. We believe this implies that students need:

• a philosophically -and sociologically- informed appreciation of ideas on the nature of 'value' and the ways in which texts, practices and institutions may be said to be ,value-laden';
• an appreciation of work in environmental philosophy and ethics -in order to identify commitments to specific environmental values in texts, practices and institutions [7].

Conclusions

We have argued in this paper that epistemological and values awareness are prerequisites for critical thinking and interdisciplinarity in environmental higher education. In practice, we think this means that all broad-based environmental higher education programmes should involve teaching and learning that draws upon the disciplines of the philosophy and sociology of knowledge -including scientific knowledge; and upon environmental philosophy and ethics. It should go without saying, however, that it would not be sufficient merely to 'bolt on' new units or modules covering these areas. What is required is the application of insights deriving from these areas throughout the whole learning process in environmental higher education. The question of how this end can best be achieved is beyond the scope of this paper but is the primary focus of our ongoing work on the TALESSI project (see the paper by Jones & Merritt elsewhere in this symposium).

Acknowledgements

At the time of writing this paper, Clare Palmer was a research fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Western Australia. She would like to acknowledge the support provided by the University of Western Australia during that time.

Correspondence: Dr Peter C. Jones, School of Humanities, University of Greenwich, Wellington Street, London, SE18 6PF, UK. Tel: +44 (0)181 3319559. Fax: +44 (0)181 3318205. Email: p.c.jones@greenwich.ac.uk. Mr J. Quentin Merritt, School of Humanities, University of Greenwich, Wellington Street, London, SE18 6PF, UK. Tel: +44 (0)181 3319065. Fax: +44 (0)181 3318205. Email: j.q.merritt@greenwich.ac.uk. Dr Clare Palmer, Department of Religious Studies, University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland, FK9 4LA, UK Tel: +44 (0)1786 467968. Fax: +44 (0)1786 466233. Email: c.a.palmer@stir.ac.uk

NOTES

[1] Critical realism is sometimes labelled as scientific realism, although the latter term is also used to denote one of the varieties of traditional, analytic realism.

[2] Andrew Sayer is, perhaps, at the forefront of those who have developed a critical realist approach in human geography (Cloke et al., 1991).

[3] Norris draws extensively on Derrida's philosophy of deconstruction in his arguments against relativism, which (as he admits himself) might seem strange to those who associate Derrida with the relativism of most poststructuralist thought.

[4] This perception is based on (i) a review of the summary report and individual institutional assessment produced by HEFCE following the 1994 Teaching Quality Assessment exercise, (ii) information obtained whilst conducting our own interviews and focus groups with practitioners in a range of institutions and (iii) observations derived from less formal networking with colleagues.

[5] In the context of geography, Cloke et al. (1991, pp. 132-133) cite Gibson's strikingly similar characterisation of the 'Naîve Realist, or common-sense geographer'.

[6] We use the term 'crude realism' rather than the sometimes-used 'naîve realism' in order to distinguish this common-sense version from Dancy's (1985) formally articulated version.

[7] Note that there is no single, uncontested approach to questions of environmental value, even amongst so-called environmentalists, any more than there is a universally agreed epistemology. Rather, scholars have elaborated a range of competing, often mutually exclusive, approaches (see, for example, Armstrong & Botzler, 1993).

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